

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

TO: OLC

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM		X (4,5,9a&b)*		
4	DD/NFA	1a,3a,4	(1,2,3,4,5) *		
5	DD/CT	2,7	(2,3b&c,4,5,7)*		
6	DD/A		X (8)*		
7	DD/O	1b,3a,8c	(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) *		
8	DD/S&T		X (2,3,4,5,7)*		
9	GC	4	(4,5)*		
10	LC		X (4,5,9a,b&c)*		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	ES		X		
19	Cdr. Rixse		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

*Extracted.

D/ [Signature] Executive Secretary

21 Sept 78

Date

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Executive Registry


78-2662

20 SEP 1978

OLC # 78-4084

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
19 September 1978



5. Harold Brown came in the room and I raised the question of Title I and Congressional notification. I said that while I had agreed with Harold's position, I thought we should also have a fall-back position if we can't negotiate his position with the Congress. Brzezinski said that is the way he had recommended it as he forwarded it to the President. Brown agreed that that was a reasonable position. Brzezinski said he had told the President that if we went all the way to keeping them fully and currently informed, it could mean that we would have to release Presidential Decisions. We were interrupted and I didn't have time to argue that one.

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2 IMPDET CL BY DCI

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9. I did not cover the following items:

a. The PRC working group meeting. Don't think I need to at this point.

b. The part of the Kampiles case about whether we should have an SCC meeting on whether we will release the document, and assumption that any release of documentation will reveal the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance.

c. The HPSCI meeting on response to the Boland/Wilson/Aspin letter. Jay's chart on this is very helpful.

(1) On the first row of a routine media or agent of influence activity, I am not sure where

the provision is that we notify the Congress of each perspective.

(2) On the covert activity judged to be of high risk operationally where we have a memorandum of notification, I am not sure what kinds of things these are. If they are under a perspective and are of high risk operationally, it seems to me we might simply draw this as an extension of the previous chart with perspective leading into the CIA box, leading into the memo of notification and so on. This would show that Congress got off the track at the perspective and wouldn't necessarily be informed of the fact that this was a sensitive activity, but that there was a special check when CIA considered it sensitive.

(3) Could we not under international terrorism and narcotics simply use the perspective device here also? The fact that the Ambassador was involved in it, in addition, is just another clearance matter. In short, can't we sort of merge this with the first one also? And the same with foreign domestic terrorism, by changing certification to perspective. Not having had an opportunity to discuss this, I wonder if we can't now look at revising the procedures themselves and come up with something much simpler. It looks to me like it is possible.

St
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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